有趣的世界名人故事演讲稿1 这次战役尽管我们失利，但我们决不投降，决不屈服，我们将战斗到底。 我们必须非常慎重，不要把这次援救说成是胜利。战争不是靠撤退赢得的。但是，在这次援救中却蕴藏着胜利，这下面是小编为大家整理的有趣世界名人故事演讲稿,菁选2篇,供大家参考。
有趣的世界名人故事演讲稿1
这次战役尽管我们失利，但我们决不投降，决不屈服，我们将战斗到底。
我们必须非常慎重，不要把这次援救说成是胜利。战争不是靠撤退赢得的。但是，在这次援救中却蕴藏着胜利，这一点应当注意到。这个胜利是空军获得的。归来的许许多多士兵未曾见到过我们空军的行动，他们看到的只是逃脱我们空军掩护性攻击的敌人轰炸机。他们低估了我们空军的成就。关于这件事，其理由就在这里。我一定要把这件事告诉你们。
这是英国和德国空军实力的一次重大考验。德国空军的目的是要是我们从海滩撤退成为不可能，并且要击沉所有密集在那里数以千计的船只。除此之外，你们能想象出他们还有更大的目的吗?除此而外，从整个战争的目的来说，还有什么更大的军事重要性和军事意义呢?他们曾全力以赴，但他们终于被击退了;他们在执行他们的任务中遭到挫败。我们把陆军撤退了，他们付出的代价，四倍于他们给我们造成的损失......已经证明，我们所有的各种类型的飞机和我们所有的飞行人员比他们现在面临的敌人都要都好。
当我们说在英伦三岛上空抵御来自海外的袭击将对我们更有好处时，我应当指出，我从这些事实里找到了一个可靠的论据，我们实际可行而有万无一失的办法就是根据这个论据想出来的。我对这些青年飞行员表示敬意。强大的法国陆军当时在几千辆装甲车的冲击下大部分溃退了。难道不可以说，文明事业本身将有数千飞行员的本领和忠诚来保护吗?
有人对我说，希特勒先生有一个入侵英伦三岛的计划，过去也时常有人这么盘算过。当拿破仑带着他的*底船和他的大军在罗涅驻扎一年之后，有人对他说：“英国那边有厉害的杂草。”自从英国远征军归来后，这种杂草当然就更多了。
我们目前在英国本土拥有的兵力比我们在这次大战中或上次大战中任何时候的兵力不知道要强大多少倍，这一事实当然对抵抗入侵本土防御问题其有利作用。但不能这样继续下去。我们不能满足于打防御战，我们对我们的盟国负有义务，我们必须再重新组织在英勇的总司令戈特勋爵指挥下发动英国远征军。这一切都在进行中，但是在这段期间，我们必须使我们本土上的防御达到这样一种高度的组织水*，即只需要极少数的人便可以有效地保障安全，同时又可发挥攻势活动最大的潜力。我们现在正进行着方面的部署。
这次战役尽管我们失利，但我们决不投降，决不屈服，我们将战斗到底，我
们将在法国战斗，我们将在海洋上战斗，我们将充满信心在空中战斗!我们将不惜任何代价保卫本土，我们将在海滩上战斗!在敌人登陆地点作战!在田野和街头作战!在山区作战!我们任何时候都不会投降。即使我们这个岛屿或这个岛屿的大部分被敌人占领，并陷于饥饿之中，我们有英国舰队武装和保护的海外帝国也将继续战斗。
这次战役我军死伤战士达三万人，损失大炮近千门，海峡*的港口也都落入希特勒手中，德国将向我国或法国发动新的攻势，已成为既定的"事实。法兰西和比利时境内的战争，已成为千古憾事。法军的势力被削弱，比利时的军队被歼灭，相比较而言，我军的实力较为强大。现在已经是检验英德空军实力的时候到了!撤退回国的士兵都认为，我们的空军未能发挥应有的作用，但是，要知道我们已经出动了所有的飞机，用尽了所有的飞行员，以寡敌众，绝非这一次!在今后的时间内，我们可能还会遭受更严重的损失，曾经让我们深信不疑的防线，大部分被突破，很多有价值的工矿都已经被敌人占领。从今后，我们要做好充分准备，准备承受更严重的困难。对于防御性战争，决不能认为已经定局!我们必须重建远征军，我们必须重建远征军，我们必须加强国防，必须减少国内的防卫兵力，增加海外的打击力量。在这次大战中，法兰西和不列颠将联合一起，决不屈服，决不投降!
有趣的世界名人故事演讲稿2
Good evening, my fellow Americans.
晚上好!亲爱的同胞们：
Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world, the war in Vietnam.
今晚，我想与各位探讨一个问题，这是所有美国人和全球无数人所深切关注的一个问题——越南战争。
I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.
我认为，在关于越南战争一事上，大家的观点出现了严重分歧的一个重要原因在于：很多美国民众对我们的*所宣扬的政策已失去了信心。当前情况下，除非美国人民真正认清政策本质，否则不能也不应该被要求去支持涉及战争与和*等重大问题的政策。
Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me.
所以，今晚，我想借此机会回答一些问题，一些萦绕在你们许多人脑海中的问题。
How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first place?
How has this administration changed the policy of the previous Administration?
What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and on the battlefront in Vietnam?
What choices do we have if we are to end the war?
What are the prospects for peace?
Now let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on January 20: The war had been going on for four years. Thirty-one thousand Americans had been killed in action. The training program for the South Vietnamese was beyond [behind] schedule. Five hundred and forty-thousand Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to reduce the number. No progress had been made at the negotiations in Paris and the United States had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal.
The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friends, as well as our enemies, abroad.
In view of these circumstances, there were some who urged that I end the war at once by ordering the immediate withdrawal of all American forces. From a political standpoint, this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was in office. I could blame the defeat, which would be the result of my action, on him -- and come out as the peacemaker. Some put it to me quite bluntly: This was the only way to avoid allowing Johnson’s war to become Nixon’s war.
But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my Administration, and of the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation, and on the future of peace and freedom in America, and in the world.
Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace. The question at issue is not whether Johnson’s war becomes Nixon’s war. The great question is: How can we win America’s peace?
Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue: Why and how did the United States become involved in Vietnam in the first place? Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution.
In response to the request of the Government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam.
Now many believe that President Johnson’s decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong. And many others, I among them, have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted.
But the question facing us today is: Now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it?
In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace.
For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before. They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor camps.
We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city of Hue last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves.
With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities at Hue would become the nightmare of the entire nation and particularly for the million-and-a half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the North.
For the United States this first defeat in our nation’s history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership not only in Asia but throughout the world.
Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done.
In 1963 President Kennedy with his characteristic eloquence and clarity said,
"We want to see a stable Government there," carrying on the [a] struggle to maintain its national independence." We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam but Southeast Asia. So we’re going to stay there."
President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office.
For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would be a disaster of immense magnitude. A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends. Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of worlds conquest. This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace -- in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere. Ultimately, this would cost more lives. It would not bring peace. It would bring more war.
For these reasons I rejected the recommendation that I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and the battle front in order to end the war fought on many fronts. I initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts. In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, on a number of other occasions, I set forth our peace proposals in great detail.
We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within one year. We have proposed a cease fire under international supervision. We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force. And the Saigon government has pledged to accept the result of the election.
We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated that we’re willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable, except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future.
At the Paris peace conference Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in 40 public meetings. Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. They demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms which are that we withdraw all American forces immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the government of South Vietnam as we leave.
We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums and public statements. I recognized in January that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum. That is why in addition to the public statements and negotiations, I have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement.
Tonight, I am taking the unprecedented step of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for peace, initiatives we undertook privately and secretly because we thought we thereby might open a door which publicly would be closed.
I did not wait for my inauguration to begin my quest for peace. Soon after my election, through an individual who was directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Vietnam, I made two private offers for a rapid, comprehensive settlement. Hanoi’s replies called in effect for our surrender before negotiations. Since the Soviet Union furnishes most of the military equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of State Rogers, my assistant for national security affairs, Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador Lodge and I personally have met on a number of occasions with representatives of the Soviet Government to enlist their assistance in getting meaningful negotiations started. In addition, we have had extended discussions directed toward that same end with representatives of other governments which have diplomatic relations with North Vietnam.
None of these initiatives have to date produced results. In mid-July I became convinced that it was necessary to make a major move to break the deadlock in the Paris talks. I spoke directly in this office, where I’m now sitting, with an individual who had known Ho Chi Minh on a personal basis for 25 years. Through him I sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh. I did this outside of the usual diplomatic channels with the hope that with the necessity of making statements for propaganda removed, there might be constructive progress toward bringing the war to an end.
Let me read from that letter to you now:
I realize that it is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf of four years of war. But precisely because of this gulf I wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just peace. I dee* believe that the war in Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one, least of all the people of Vietnam. The time has come to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of this tragic war. You will find us forthcoming and open-minded in a common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the brave people of Vietnam. Let history record that at this critical juncture both sides turned their face toward peace rather than toward conflict and war."
I received Ho Chi Minh’s re* on August 30, three days before his death. It sim* reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken at Paris and flatly rejected my initiative. The full text of both letters is being released to the press.
In addition to the public meetings that I have referred to, Ambassador Lodge has met with Vietnam’s chief negotiator in Paris in 11 private sessions. And we have taken other significant initiatives which must remain secret to keep open some channels of communications which may still prove to be productive.
But the effect of all the public, private, and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since the bombing halt a year ago, and since this Administration came into office on January 20th, can be summed up in one sentence: No progress whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table.
Well, now, who’s at fault? It’s become clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of the United States. It is not the South Vietnamese Government. The obstacle is the other side’s absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace. And it will not do so while it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our next concession, and our next concession after that one, until it gets everything it wants.
There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiation depends only on Hanoi ’s deciding to negotiate -- to negotiate seriously. I realize that this report on our efforts on the diplomatic front is discouraging to the American people, but the American people are entitled to know the truth -- the bad news as well as the good news -- where the lives of our young men are involved.
Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report on another front. At the time we launched our search for peace, I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiations. I therefore put into effect another plan to bring peace -- a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front. It is in line with the major shift in U. S. foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guam on July 25. Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine -- a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future Vietnams.
推荐访问: 演讲稿 有趣 名人 有趣世界名人故事演讲稿 菁选2篇 有趣的世界名人故事演讲稿1 有趣的世界名人故事演讲稿100字